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ABSTRACT
Distributed ledger systems (i.e., blockchains) have received a lot of
attention recently. They promise to enable mutually untrusted par-
ticipants to execute transactions, while providing the immutability
of the transaction history and censorship resistance. Although de-
centralized ledgers may become a disruptive innovation, as of today,
they suffer from scalability, privacy, or governance issues. There-
fore, they are inapplicable for many important use cases, where
interestingly, centralized ledger systems quietly gain adoption and
find new use cases. Unfortunately, centralized ledgers have also
several drawbacks, like a lack of efficient verifiability or a higher
risk of censorship and equivocation.
In this paper, we present Aquareum, a novel framework for cen-
tralized ledgers removing their main limitations. By combining
a trusted execution environment with a public blockchain plat-
form, Aquareum provides publicly verifiable, non-equivocating,
censorship-evident, private, and high-performance ledgers. Aqua-
reum ledgers are integratedwith a Turing-complete virtual machine,
allowing arbitrary transaction processing logics, including tokens
or client-specified smart contracts. Aquareum is fully implemented
and deployment-ready, even with currently existing technologies.
1 INTRODUCTION
Ledger systems are append-only databases providing immutability
(i.e., tamper resistance) as a core property. To facilitate their append-
only feature, cryptographic constructions, such as hash chains
or hash trees, are usually deployed. Traditionally, public ledger
systems are centralized, controlled by a single entity that acts as a
trusted party. In such a setting, ledgers are being deployed in various
applications, including payments, logging, timestamping services,
repositories, or public logs of various artifacts (e.g., keys [6, 33],
certificates issued by authorities [29], and binaries [17]).
Although being successfully deployed and envisioned for mul-
tiple novel use cases, centralized ledgers have some fundamental
limitations due to their centralization. Firstly, they lack efficient
verifiability, which would ensure their clients that the ledger is
indeed append-only and internally consistent (i.e., does not con-
tain conflicting transactions). A naive solution is just to publish
the ledger or share it with parties interested in auditing it, which,
however, may be inefficient or stand against the ledger operator’s
deployment models (e.g., the privacy of the clients conducting fi-
nancial transactions can be violated). Second, it is challenging to
provide non-equivocation to centralized systems [31]. In simple yet
devastating fork attacks, a ledger operator creates two conflicting
copies of the ledger and presents it to different clients. Although
the forked ledgers are internally consistent, the “global” view of the
database is equivocated, thus completely undermining the security
of the entire system. Finally, centralized systems are inherently
prone to censorship. A ledger operator can refuse any request or a
transaction at her will without leaving any evidence of censoring.
This may be risky especially when a censored client may suffer
from some consequences (e.g., fines when being unable to settle
a transaction on time) or in the case when the operator wishes to
hide some ledger content (e.g., data proving her misbehavior). On
the other hand, recently emerged public distributed ledgers com-
bine an append-only cryptographic data structure with a consensus
algorithm, spreading trust across all participating consensus nodes.
These systems are by design publicly verifiable, non-equivocating,
and censorship resistant. However, they offer a low throughput,
they are expensive in deployment, they do not inherently provide
privacy, and their public nature makes their governance difficult
and unacceptable for many applications.
Proposed Approach. In this paper, we propose Aquareum, a
framework for centralized ledgers mitigating their main limitations.
Aquareum employs trusted execution environment (TEE) and a
public smart contract platform (i.e., built on a blockchain) to pro-
vide verifiability, non-equivocation, and to mitigate censorship. In
Aquareum, a ledger operator deploys a pre-defined TEE enclave
code, which verifies the consistency and correctness of the ledger
for every ledger update. Then, a proof produced by the enclave
is published utilizing an existing public smart contract platform,
guaranteeing that the given snapshot of the ledger is verified and
no alternative snapshot of this ledger exists. Furthermore, when-
ever a client suspects that her query (or transaction) is censored,
she can (confidentially) request a resolution of the query via the
smart contract platform. The ledger operator noticing the query
is obligated to handle it. She passes the query to the enclave that
creates a public proof of query resolution and publishes it using the
smart contract platform. With such a censorship-evident design, an
operator is publicly visible when misbehaving, thus the clients can
take appropriate actions (e.g., suing the operator) or encode some
automated service-level agreements into their smart contracts.
Aquareum can be adjusted to different ledgers and use cases, but
we implemented and deployed it with minimized Ethereum Virtual
Machine (EVM) since EVM provides a Turing-complete execution
environment and it is widely adopted in the community of decen-
tralized applications. Aquareum enables hosting and execution of
arbitrary ledger applications, such as key:value databases, tokens,
or client-defined smart contracts, while preserving the same en-
clave code for verification. Aquareum is fully implemented and we
show that it is practical and efficient, even when built using the
current technologies and tools.
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2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Blockchain and Smart Contracts
A blockchain (a.k.a., a distributed ledger) is an append-only data
structure that is resistant by design against modifications combined
with a consensus protocol. In a blockchain, blocks containing data
records are linked using a cryptographic hash function, and each
new block has to be agreed upon by participants running a consen-
sus protocol (i.e., consensus nodes). Each block may contain data
records representing orders that transfer crypto-tokens, application
codes written in a platform-supported language, and the execution
orders of such application codes. These application codes are re-
ferred to as smart contracts, and they encode arbitrary processing
logic (e.g., agreements) written in a supported language of a smart
contract platform. Interactions between clients and the smart con-
tract platform are based on messages called transactions, which can
contain either orders transferring crypto-tokens or calls of smart
contract functions. All transactions sent to a blockchain are vali-
dated by consensus nodes who maintain a replicated state of the
blockchain. To incentivize consensus nodes, blockchain platforms
introduce reward and fee schemes.
2.2 Trusted Execution Environment
Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) is a hardware-based compo-
nent that can securely execute arbitrary code in an isolated environ-
ment. TEE uses cryptography primitives and hardware-embedded
secrets that protect data confidentiality and the integrity of compu-
tations. In particular, the adversary model of TEE usually includes
privileged applications and an operating system, which may com-
promise unprivileged user-space applications. There are several
practical instances of TEE, such as Intel Software Guard Extensions
(SGX) [1, 23, 32] available at Intel’s CPUs or based on RISC-V ar-
chitecture such as Keystone-enclave [15] and Sanctum [11]. In the
context of this work, we built on top of Intel SGX, therefore we
adopt the terminology introduced by it.
Intel SGX is a set of instructions that ensures hardware-level
isolation of protected user-space codes called enclaves. An enclave
process cannot execute system calls but can read and write mem-
ory outside the enclave. Thus isolated execution in SGX may be
viewed as an ideal model in which a process is guaranteed to be
executed correctly with ideal confidentiality, while it might run on
a potentially malicious operating system.
Intel SGX allows a local process or a remote system to securely
communicate with the enclave as well as execute verification of
the integrity of the enclave’s code. When an enclave is created,
the CPU outputs a report of its initial state, also referred to as
a measurement, which is signed by the private key of TEE and
encrypted by a public key of Intel Attestation Service (IAS). The
hardware-protected signature serves as the proof that the measured
code is running in an SGX-protected enclave, while the encryption
by IAS public key ensures that the SGX-equipped CPU is genuine
and was manufactured by Intel. This proof is also known as a quote
or attestation, and it can be verified by a local process or by a remote
system. The enclave process-provided public key can be used by a
verifier to establish a secure channel with the enclave or to verify
the signature during the attestation. We assume that a trustworthy
measurement of the enclave’s code is available for any client that
wishes to verify an attestation.
2.3 Merkle Tree
A Merkle tree [34] is a data structure based on the binary tree in
which each leaf node contains a hash of a single data block, while
each non-leaf node contains a hash of its concatenated children.
At the top of a Merkle tree is the root hash, which provides a
tamper-evident summary of the contents. A Merkle tree enables
efficient verification as to whether some data are associated with
a leaf node by comparing the expected root hash of a tree with
the one computed from a hash of the data in the query and the
remaining nodes required to reconstruct the root hash (i.e., proof
or authentication path). The reconstruction of the root hash has the
logarithmic time and space complexity, which makes the Merkle
tree an efficient scheme for membership verification. To provide
a membership verification of element xi in the list of elements
X = {xi }, i ≥ 1, the Merkle tree supports the following operations:
MkRoot(X) → Root: an aggregation of all elements of the list X
by a Merkle tree, providing a single value Root .
MkProof(xi,X) → πmk: a Merkle proof generation for the ith
element xi present in the list of all elements X .
πmk.Verify(xi,Root) → {True, False}: verification of the Merkle
proof πmk , witnessing that xi is included in the list X that
is aggregated by the Merkle tree with the root hash Root .
2.4 History Tree
A Merkle tree has been primarily used for proving membership.
However, Crosby and Wallach [12] extended its application for
an append-only tamper-evident log, denoted as a history tree. A
history tree is the Merkle tree, in which leaf nodes are added in
an append-only fashion, and which allows to produce logarith-
mic proofs witnessing that arbitrary two versions of the tree are
consistent (i.e., one version of the tree is an extension of another).
Therefore, once added, a leaf node cannot be modified or removed.
A history tree brings a versioned computation of hashes over the
Merkle tree, enabling to prove that different versions (i.e., commit-
ments) of a log, with distinct root hashes, make consistent claims
about the past. To provide a tamper-evident history system [12],
the log represented by the history tree L supports the following
operations:
L.add(x) → Cj: appending of the record x to L, returning a new
commitment Cj that represents the most recent value of
the root hash of the history tree.
L.IncProof(Ci,Cj) → π inc: an incremental proof generation be-
tween two commitments Ci and Cj , where i ≤ j.
L.MemProof(i,Cj) → πmem: a membership proof generation for
the record xi from the commitment Cj , where i ≤ j.
π inc.Verify(Ci,Cj) → {True, False}: verification of the incremen-
tal proof π inc , witnessing that the commitmentCj contains
the same history of records xk ,k ∈ {0, . . . , i} as the com-
mitment Ci , where i ≤ j.
πmem.Verify(i, xi,Cj) → {True, False}: verification of the mem-
bership proof πmem , witnessing that xi is the ith record
in the jth version of L, fixed by the commitment Cj , i ≤ j.
2
π inc.DeriveNewRoot() → Cj: a reconstruction of the commitment
Cj from the incremental proof π inc that was generated by
L.IncProo f (Ci ,Cj ).
π inc.DeriveOldRoot() → Ci: a reconstruction of the commitment
Ci from the incremental proof π inc that was generated by
L.IncProo f (Ci ,Cj ).
2.5 Radix and Merkle-Patricia Tries
Radix trie serves as a key-value storage. In the Radix trie, every
node at the l-th layer of the trie has the form of ⟨(p0,p1, . . . ,pn ),v⟩,
where v is a stored value and all pi , i ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,n} represent
the pointers on the nodes in the next (lower) layer l + 1 of the
trie, which is selected by following the (l + 1)-th item of the key.
Note that key consists of an arbitrary number of items that belong
to an alphabet with n symbols (e.g., hex symbols). Hence, each
node of the Radix trie has n children and to access a leaf node
(i.e., data v), one must descend the trie starting from the root node
while following the items of the key one-by-one. Note that Radix
trie requires underlying database of key-value storage that maps
pointers to nodes. However, Radix trie does not contain integrity
protection, and when its key is too long (e.g., hash value), the Radix
trie will be sparse, thus imposing a high overhead for storage of all
the nodes on the path from the root to values.
Merkle Patricia Trie (MPT) [40, 49] is a combination of theMerkle
tree (see Section 2.3) and Radix trie data structures, and similar the
Radix Trie, it serves as a key-value data storage. However, in con-
trast to Radix trie, the pointers are replaced by a cryptographically
secure hash of the data in nodes, providing integrity protection.
In detail, MPT guarantees integrity by using a cryptographically
secure hash of the value for the MPT key as well as for the real-
ization of keys in the underlying database that maps the hashes of
nodes to their content; therefore, the hash of the root node of the
MPT represents an integrity snapshot of the whole MPT trie. Next,
Merkle-Patricia trie introduces the extension nodes, due to which,
there is no need to keep a dedicated node for each item of the path
in the key. The MPT trie T supports the following operations:
T.root→ Root: accessing the hash of the root node of MPT, which
is stored as a key in the underlying database.
T.add(k, x) → Root: adding the value x with the key k to T while
obtaining the new hash value of the root node.
T.get(k) → {x,⊥}: fetching a value x that corresponds to key k ;
return ⊥ if no such value exists.
T.delete(k) → {True, False}: deleting the entry with key equal to
k , returning True upon success, False otherwise.
T.MptProof(k) → {πmpt,πmpt}: aMPT (inclusion / exclusion) proof
generation for the entry with key k .
πmpt.Verify(k,Root) → {True, False}: verification of theMPT proof
πmpt , witnessing that entry with the key k is in the MPT
whose hash of the root node is equal to Root .
πmpt.VerifyNeg(k,Root) → {True, False}: verification of the neg-
ative MPT proof, witnessing that entry with the key k is
not in the MPT with the root hash equal to Root .
2.6 Notation
The notation used throughout the paper is presented in the follow-
ing. By {msд}U, we denote the message msд digitally signed by
U, and bymsд.σ we refer to a signature; h(.) stands for a crypto-
graphic hash function; ∥ is the string concatenation; % represents
modulo operation over integers; Σp .{KeyGen,Veri f y, Siдn} repre-
sents a signature (and encryption) scheme of the platform p, where
p ∈ {pb, tee} (i.e., public blockchain platform and trusted execution
environment platform); and SKp
U
, PKp
U
is the private/public key-pair
ofU, under Σp . Then, we use π s for denoting proofs of various data
structures s ∈ {mk,mem, inc}: πmk denotes the inclusion proof in
the Merkle tree, πmem and π inc denote the membership proof and
the incremental proof in the history tree, respectively.
3 SYSTEM MODEL AND OVERVIEW
3.1 System Model
In Aquareum, an operator is an entity that maintains and manages
a ledger containing chronologically sorted transactions. Clients
interact with the ledger by sending requests, such as queries and
transactions to be handled. We assume that all involved parties
can interact with a blockchain platform supporting smart contracts
(e.g., Ethereum). Next, we assume that the operator has access to a
TEE platform (e.g., Intel SGX). Finally, we assume that the operator
can be malicious and her goals are as follows:
Violation of the ledger’s integrity by creating its internal in-
consistent state – e.g., via inserting two conflicting trans-
actions or by removing/modifying existing transactions.
Equivocation of the ledger by presenting at least two inconsis-
tent views of the ledger to (at least) two distinct clients
who would accept such views as valid.
Censorship of client queries without leaving any audit trails
evincing the censorship occurrence.
Next, we assume that the adversary cannot undermine the crypto-
graphic primitives used, the underlying blockchain platform, and
the TEE platform deployed.
3.2 Desired Properties
We target the following security properties for Aquareum ledgers:
Verifiability: clients should be able to obtain easily verifiable
evidence that the ledger they interact with is internally
correct and consistent. In particular, it means that none of
the previously inserted transaction was neither modified
nor deleted, and there are no conflicting transactions. Tra-
ditionally, the verifiability is achieved by replicating the
ledger (like in blockchains) or by trusted auditors who
download the full copy of the ledger and sequentially vali-
date it. However, this property should be provided even if
the operator does not wish to share the full database with
third parties. Besides, the system should be self-auditable,
such that any client can easily verify (and prove to others)
that some transaction is included in the ledger, and she can
prove the state of the ledger at the given point in time.
Non-Equivocation: the system should protect from forking at-
tacks and thus guarantee that no concurrent (equivocating)
versions of the ledger exist at any point in time. The conse-
quence of this property is that whenever a client interacts
with the ledger or relies on the ledger’s logged artifacts,
the client is ensured that other clients have ledger views
consistent with her view.
3
Censorship Evidence: preventing censorship in a centralized sys-
tem is particularly challenging, as its operator can simply
pretend unavailability in order to censor undesired queries
or transactions. However, this property requires that when-
ever the operator censors client’s requests, the client can do
a resolution of an arbitrary (i.e., censored) request publicly.
We emphasize that proving censorship is a non-trivial task
since it is difficult to distinguish “pretended” unavailability
from “genuine” one. Genuine censorship evidence enables
clients to enforce potential service-level agreements with
the operator, either by a legal dispute or by automated
rules encoded in smart contracts.
Besides those properties, we intend the system to provide privacy
(keeping the clients’ communication confidential), efficiency and
high performance, not introducing any significant overhead, deploy-
ability with today’s technologies and infrastructures, as well as
flexibility enabling various applications and scenarios.
3.3 High-Level Overview
Aquareum ledger is initialized by an operator (O) who creates an
internal ledger (L) that will store all transactions processed and the
state that they render. Initially, L contains an empty transaction set
and a null state. During the initialization, O creates a TEE enclave
(E) whose role is to execute updates of L and verify consistency of
L before each update. Initialization of E involves the generation of
two public private key pairs – one for the signature scheme of TEE
(i.e., PKtee
E
, SKtee
E
) and one for the signature scheme of the public
blockchain (i.e., PKpb
E
, SK
pb
E
).1 The code of E is publicly-known
(see Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 6), and it can be remotely attested
with the TEE infrastructure by any client.
Next, O generates her public-private key pair (i.e., PKO, SKO)
and deploys a special smart contract (S) initialized with the empty L
represented by its hash LHash, the operator’s public key PKO, and
both enclave public keys PKtee
E
and PKpb
E
. After the deployment
of S, an instance of L is uniquely identified by the address of S. A
client (C) wishing to interact with L obtains the address of S and
performs the remote attestation of E using the PKtee
E
.
Whenever C sends a transaction to O (see Figure 1), E validates
whether it is authentic and non-conflicting; and if so, E updates
L with the transaction, yielding the new version of L. The C is
responded with a receipt and “a version transition of L”, both signed
by E, which prove that the transaction was processed successfully
and is included in the new version of L. For efficiency reasons,
transactions are processed in batches that are referred to as blocks.
In detail,O starts the update procedure of L (see Figure 1) as follows:
a) O sends all received transactions since the previous update to
E, together with the current partial state of L and a small subset
of L’s data ∂Li , such that h(∂Li ) = h(Li ), which is required to
validate L’s consistency and perform its incremental extension.
b) E validates and executes the transactions in its virtual machine,
updates the current partial state and partial data of L, and finally
creates a blockchain transaction2 {h(∂Li ),h(∂Li+1)}E signed by
SK
pb
E
, which represents a version transition of the ledger from
1Note that neither of the private keys ever leaves E.
2Note that {h(∂Li ), h(∂Li+1)}E = {h(Li ), h(Li+1)}E
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Figure 1: Operation procedure of Aquareum ledger.
version i to its new version i + 1, also referred to as the version
transition pair.
c) The blockchain transaction with version transition pair is re-
turned to O, who sends this transaction to S.
d) S accepts the second item of the version transition pair as the
current hash of L iff it is signed by SKpb
E
and the current hash
of L stored by S (i.e., LHash) is equal to the first item of the pair.
After the update of L is finished, clients with receipts obtained can
verify that their transactions were processed by E (see details in
Section 4.3). The update procedure ensures that the new version of
L is: (1) internally correct since it was executed by trusted code
of E, (2) a consistent extension of the previous version – relying
on trusted code of E and a witnessed version transition by S, and
(3) non-equivocating since S stores only hash of a single version
of L (i.e., LHash) at any point in time.
Whenever C suspects that her transactions or read queries are
censored,Cmight send such requests via S (see details in Section 4.4
and Section 4.5). To do so, C encrypts her request with PKpb
E
and
publishes it on the blockchain via S. O noticing a new request is
obligated to pass the request toE, whichwill process the request and
reply with an encrypted response (by PKpb
C
) that is processed by S.
If a pending request at S is not handled by O, it is public evidence
that O censors the request. We do not specify how can C utilize
such a proof, but it could be shown in a potential legal dispute or S
itself could have an automated deposit-based punishments rules.
3.4 Design Consideration
We might design L as an append-only chain (as in blockchains), but
such a design would bring a high overhead on clients who want to
verify that a particular block is a part of L. During the verification,
clients would have to download the headers of all blocks between
the head of L and the block in the query, resulting into linear space
& time complexity. In contrast, when a history tree (see Section 2.4)
is utilized for integrity preservation of L, the presence of any block
in L can be verified with logarithmic space and time complexity.
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Figure 2: Aquareum components. Trusted components are depicted in green.
4 DETAILS
The schematic overview of Aquareum is depicted in Figure 2, where
trusted components are depicted in green. The right part of the
figure describes data aggregation of L. We utilize a history tree [12]
for tamper-evident logging of data blocks due to its efficient mem-
bership and incremental proofs (see Section 3.4). The aggregation
of blocks within a history tree is represented by root hash LRoot ,
which instantiates ledger hash LHash from Section 3.3. In Aqua-
reum, each data block consists of a header, a list of transactions,
and a list of execution receipts from VM that is running within E.
A header contains the following fields:
• ID: this field is assigned for each newly created block as
a counter of all blocks. ID of each block represents the
IDth version of the history tree of L, which contains blocks
B0, . . . ,BID−1 and is characterized by the root hash r ←
MkRoot({H0, . . . ,HID−1}), where Hi stands for a header
of a block Bi . Note that the IDth version of L with the root
hash r can also be expressed by the notation #(r ).
• txsRoot, rcpRoot: two root hash values that aggregate set
of transactions and the set of their corresponding execution
receipts (containing execution logs) by Merkle trees [34],
• stRoot: the root hash that aggregates the current global
state of the virtual machine by Merkle-Patricia trie [40, 49].
In detail, MPT aggregates all account states into a global
state, where keys of MPT represent IDs of client accounts
(i.e., h(PKpb
C
)) and values represent an account state data
structures, which (similar to [49]) contains: (1) balance
of a native token (if any), (2) code that is executed when
an account receives a transaction; accounts with no code
represent simple accounts and accounts with a code field
represent smart contract accounts, (3) nonce represents the
number of transactions sent from the simple account or the
number of contracts created by the smart contract account,
(4) storage represents encoded variables of a smart contract,
which can be realized by Merkle-Patricia trie [40, 49] or
other integrity-preserving mapping structures.
AlthoughO persists the full content of L (and maintains its full state
in the memory), she is unable to directly modify L while remaining
undetected since all modifications of L must be done through E. In
detail, upon receiving enough transactions from clients, E executes
received transactions by its virtual machine (VM) and updates L
accordingly. While updating L, E leverages the incremental proofs
of the history tree to ensure integrity and consistency with the past
versions of L.
The enclave E in our approach stores the last produced header
(hdrlast ) and the current root hash of the history tree of L (i.e.,
LRoot ), which enables E to make extensions of L that are consistent
with L’s history and at the same time avoiding dishonest O to
tamper with L. Although state-fullness of E might be seen as a
limitation in the case of a failed enclave, we show how to deal with
this situation and provide a procedure that publicly replaces a failed
enclave using S (see Section 4.6).
4.1 Setup
The setup of Aquareum is presented in Figure 3.3 First, O initializes
an empty L, a root hash LRootcur for the most recent local version
of L, the root hash LRootpb for the version synchronized with PB,
the empty global state of L, and the empty list of reported censored
requests. Then, O initializes E with code proдE (see Algorithm 1).
In this initialization, E generates two key-pairs, SKpb
E
, PK
pb
E
and
SKtee
E
, PKtee
E
, respectively; the first key-pair is intended for inter-
action with the blockchain platform and the second one is intended
for the remote attestation with TEE infrastructure. Next, E initial-
izes L and two root hashes in the same vein as O did. In addition,
E stores the header hdrcur of the last block created and signed by
E and its ID. Then, E sends its public keys PKpb
E
and PKtee
E
to O.
Next, O creates a deployment transaction of S’s code proдS (see
Algorithm 2) with public keys PKpb
E
, PKtee
E
, PKO as the arguments
(see Algorithm 4 in Appendix for pseudo-code of O). Then, O sends
the deployment transaction to the blockchain. In the constructor of
S, all public keys are stored, and the root hash of L with the list of
censored requests are initialized. Finally, S publishes its identifier
SID , which serves as a public reference to S.
When the infrastructure of Aquareum is initialized, Cs register
at O. For simplicity, we omit details of the registration and access
control, and we let this up to the discretion of O.
3We assume that O has already generated her public/private key-pair PKpb
O
, SKpb
O
.
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4.2 Normal Operation
In the case of normal operation (see Figure 4), O is not censoring
any transactions produced by instances of C, hence all transactions
are correctly executed within E and appended to L, while S publicly
witnesses the correct execution of transactions and the consistency
of the new version of L with its history. In detail, when O receives
a transaction from Cx , it performs access control of Cx ,4 and upon
the success, O adds the transaction in its cache of unprocessed
transactions (see Algorithm 4 in Appendix). When O accumulates
enough transactions from clients, it passes these transactions to E,
together with the current partial state ∂statecur of the VM.
4.2.1 VM Execution with Partial State. The current partial
state of VM represents only data related to all account states that
the execution of transactions is about to modify or create. The
motivation for such an approach is the limited memory size of E
(e.g., in the case of SGX it is only ∼100MB), which does not allow
to internally store the full global state of L (neither L itself). The
partial state does not contain only the account states of concerning
transactions, but it also contains intermediary nodes of MPT (i.e.,
extension and branch nodes) that are on the path from the root node
of MPT to leaf nodes of concerning account states. Using passed
partial state, E verifies its integrity, obtains the state root of MPT
and compares it with the last known state root (i.e., hdrlast .stRoot )
produced by E. If the roots match, E executes transactions using
the passed partial state, obtains the new partial state of VM and
execution receipts with additional information about the execution
of particular transactions (i.e., return codes and logs). Note that E
obtains the new partial state by consecutively updating the current
partial state with each transaction executed.
Next, E creates the header of the new block (i.e., hdrcur ) from ag-
gregated transactions, receipts, and new partial state. Using created
header, E extends the previous version of the history tree of L, while
obtaining the new root hash LRootcur of L (see Section 4.2.2). Then,
E signs a version transition pair ⟨LRootpb ,LRootcur ⟩ of the history
tree by SKpb
E
and sends it to O, together with the new header, the
new partial state, and execution receipts. Moreover, E stores the
4For simplicity, we omit access control at O.
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Figure 4: Protocol for normal operation (ΠN ).
last produced header (i.e., hdrlast ) and the root hash LRootcur of L
associated with the last version of the history tree.
4.2.2 Incremental Update of the Ledger. We omitted the
details about the consistent update of L within E in the above
text and Figure 4. In general, an incremental update of a history
tree assumes trusted full access to its data. However, E does not
store full data of L (only the last header created), and thus cannot
directly make a consistent update of L. Therefore, we design a
simple procedure that enables E to extend L without storing it
internally.
In the procedure,O creates a proof template π incnext for the next in-
cremental proof of the history tree, which extends L exactly by one
empty block (see function nextIncProo f () in Algorithm 4) while ob-
taining a new version of Lwith the (temporary) root hash LRoottmp .
Note that this template represents ∂L from Section 3.3, and it en-
ables E to make an integrity verification and consistent extension
of L without storing it. In detail, O sends π incnext and LRoottmp to E,
together with transactions that are about to be processed by func-
tion Exec(). E verifies π incnext with respect to its last known version
of L (i.e., #(LRootcur )), replaces the header hash of the empty block
in the proof template by the hash of newly created header in E, and
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Algorithm 1: The program proдE of enclave E
▷ Declaration of types and functions:
Header { ID , txsRoot , rcpRoot , stRoot };
#(r ) → v : denotes the version v of L having LRoot = r ,
▷ Variables of TEE:
SK teeE , PK
tee
E : keypair of E under Σtee ,
SKpbE , PK
pb
E : keypair of E under Σpb ,
hdrlast ←⊥: the last header created by E,
LRootpb ←⊥: the last root of L flushed to PB,
LRootcur ←⊥: the root of L ∪ blksp (not flushed to PB),
IDcur ← 1: the current version of L (not flushed to PB),
▷ Declaration of functions:
function Init () public
(SKpbE , PK
pb
E )← Σpb .Keyдen();
(SK teeE , PK
tee
E )← Σtee .Keyдen();
Output(PK teeE , PK
pb
E );
function Exec (txs[], ∂stold , π incnext , LRoottmp ) public
assert ∂stold .root = hdrlast .stRoot ;
∂stnew , rcps, txser ← processT xs(txs, ∂stold , π incnext , LRoottmp );
σ ← Σpb .siдn(SKpbE , (LRootpb , LRootcur ));
Output(LRootpb , LRootcur , ∂stnew , hdrlast , rcps , txser , σ );
function F lush() public
LRootpb ← LRootcur ; ▷ Shift the version of L synchronized with PB.
function processT xs (txs[], ∂stold , π incnext , LRoottmp ) private
∂stnew , rcps[], txser ← runVM(txs , ∂stold ); ▷ Run txs in VM.
txs ← txs \ txser ; ▷ Filter out parsing errors/wrong signatures.
hdr ← Header(IDcur , MkRoot (txs), MkRoot (rcps), ∂stnew .root ));
hdrlast ← hdr ;
IDcur ← IDcur + 1;
LRootcur ← newLRoot (hdr, π incnext , LRoottmp );
return ∂stnew , rcps , txser ;
function newLRoot (hdr, π incnext , LRoottmp ) private
▷ A modification of the incr. proof. template to contain hdr
assert #(LRootcur ) + 1 = #(LRoottmp ); ▷ 1 block ∆.
assert π incnext .V er if y(LRootcur , LRoottmp );
π incnext [-1] ← h(hdr );
return der iveN ewRoot (π incnext );
then uses such modified proof to compute the new root hash of L,
which is then stored as LRootcur by E.
When O receives the output of E, it updates the full state of L
and creates the new block using client transactions, the received
receipts, and the header of the new block. Then, O appends the
new block to L and responds to client requests for receipts of their
transactions (see Section 4.3), which serve as promises confirming
the execution of transactions. These promises became irreversible
when O syncs L with S that runs on the blockchain platform.
4.2.3 Syncing the Ledger with the Blockchain. O periodi-
cally syncs L with S to provide non-equivocation of L. However,
O is able to sync only such a version of L that was signed within
E and is newer than the last known version by S, which provides
consistency and non-equivocation of L. During the sync of L, O
creates a special blockchain transaction containing the version tran-
sition pair ⟨LRootpb ,LRootcur ⟩ signed within E and sends it to S
(i.e., calling the function PostLRoot()). S verifies whether the ver-
sion transition pair was signed within E by checking the signature
with PKpb
E
. Then, S verifies whether the last published version of
L (corresponding to LRootpb at S) is equal to the first entry in the
version transition pair. In the positive case, S publicly performs
the version transition of L by updating its LRootpb to the second
Algorithm 2: The program proдS of the smart contract S
▷ Declaration of types and constants:
CensInfo { etx, equery, status, edata },
msд: a current transaction that called S,
▷ Declaration of functions:
function Init (PKpbE , PK
tee
E , PKO) public
PK teeE [].add (PK teeE ); ▷ PK of enclave E under Σtee .
PKpbE [].add (PK
pb
E ); ▷ PK of enclave E under Σpb .
PKpb
O
← PKO ; ▷ PK of operator O under Σpb .
LRootpb ←⊥; ▷ The most recent root hash of L synchronized with S.
censReqs ← []; ▷ Request that Cs wants to resolve publicly.
function PostLRoot (rootA, rootB, σ ) public
▷ Verify whether a state transition was made within E.
assert Σpb .ver if y((σ , PKpbE [-1]), (rootA, rootB ));
▷ Verify whether a version transition extends the last one.
if LRootpb = rootA then
LRootpb ← rootB ; ▷ Do a version transition of L.
function ReplaceEnc (PKN pbE , PKN
tee
E , rA, rB, σ , σmsд ) public
▷ Called by O in the case of enclave failure.
assert Σpb .ver if y((σmsд, PKpbO ),msд); ▷ Avoiding MiTM attack.
PostLRoot (rA, rB, σ ) ; ▷ Do a version transition.
PK teeE .add (PKN teeE ); ▷ Upon change, Cs make remote attestation.
PKpbE .add (PKN
pb
E );
function SubmitCensT x (etx, σmsд ) public
▷ Called by C in the case her TX is censored.
accessControl(σmsд,msд .PK
pb
C
);
censReqs .add(CensInfo(etx, ⊥, ⊥, ⊥));
function ResolveCensT x (idxr eq, status, σ ) public
▷ Called by O to prove that C’s TX was processed.
assert idxr eq < |censReqs |;
r ← censReqs[idxr eq ];
assert Σpb .ver if y((σ , PKpbE [-1]), (h(r .etx ), status));
r .status ← status ;
function SubmitCensQry(equery, σmsд ) public
▷ Called by C in the case its read query is censored.
accessControl(σmsд,msд .PK
pb
C
);
censReqs .add(CensInfo(⊥, equery, ⊥, ⊥));
function ResolveCensQry(idxr eq, status, edata, σ ) public
▷ Called by O as a response to the C’s censored read query.
assert idxr eq < |censReqs |;
r ← censReqs[idxr eq ];
assert
Σpb .ver if y((σ , PKpbE [-1]), (h(r .equery), status, h(edata)));
r . {edata ← edata, status ← status };
item of the version transition pair. From that moment, the Aqua-
reum transactions processed until the current version of L cannot
be tampered with – providing a non-equivocation of L. Finally, O
notifies E about successful sync by calling function Flush() (see
Algorithm 1), where E “shifts” LRootpb to LRootcur .
Note that if O were to sync L with S upon every new block cre-
ated, it might be too expensive. On the other hand, if O were to
sync L to Swith long delays, “a level” of non-equivocation would be
decreased, which in turn would extend the time to finality. Hence,
the sync interval must be viewed as a trade-off between costs and
a level of non-equivocation (see examples in Section 5.2). The fre-
quency of syncs might be defined in SLA with clients and violation
might be penalized by S.
4.3 Retrieval and Verification of Receipts
Receipt retrieval and verification serves as a lightweight audit proce-
dure in which C verifies inclusion and execution of the transaction
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Figure 5: Protocol for receipt retrieval (ΠR ).
txi by obtaining its receipt. An execution receipt contains three
fields: (1) hash of txi , (2) return code of VM, and (3) log of events
emitted by EVM.
To obtain an execution receipt of txi ,C first retrieves the last root
hash of L (i.e., LRootpb ) from S. Then, C requests O for an inclusion
proof of her transaction txi in the most recent version of L that
extends the version #(LRootpb ). Upon request,O finds a block b that
contains txi and computes a membership proof πmemhdr of b’s header
in the most recent version #(LRootcur ) of L. The second proof that
O computes is the Merkle proof πmkrcpi , which witnesses that receipt
rcpi of transaction txi is included in the block b. Then, O computes
the incremental proof π inc of the most recent version transition
⟨LRootpb ,LRootcur ⟩ that was executed within E. In response, O
sends the following data to C:
• the receipt rcpi with its proof πmkrcpi ,
• the header of b with its proof πmemhdr ,
• the most recent version LRootcur of L with its proof π inc ,
• the signature σlast of the most recent version transition
⟨LRootpb ,LRootcur ⟩ made by E.
C verifies the signature and the provided proofs against LRootpb ,
and it also checks whether the retrieved receipt corresponds to
txi . In the positive case, C has a guarantee that the transaction txi
was included in L and its execution in VM exited with a particular
status, represented by a return code in the receipt.
We highlight that the previous receipt retrieval protocol assumes
that txi is “very recent,” and is included only in the version of L that
was not synchronized with S yet. When txi is already included in
the synchronized version of L, we can put LRootcur = LRootpb in
the protocol, and thus omit computation of π inc and its verification.
We also note that the receipt retrieval protocol can be integrated
with the transaction submission in ΠN by following it.
Service Operator O Smart Contract SEnclave E
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Figure 6: Protocol for resolution of a censored transaction (ΠCT ).
4.4 Resolution of Censored Transactions
In the case when C suspects O of censoring a transaction tx (see
Figure 6),C initiates a request for an inclusion proof of tx through S.
In detail, C creates a transaction of the public blockchain platform,
which calls the function SubmitCensTx() with tx encrypted by
PK
pb
E
(i.e., etx ) as an argument and sends it to S; hence, preserving
confidentially for public. S does the access control (see Section 6.1.2),
appends etx to the list of censored requests,5 and generates asyn-
chronous event informing O about new unresolved transaction.
When O receives the event, first she decrypts tx through E and
then executes tx in E if it has not been executed before. If a fresh
execution of tx occurred, O syncs the most recent version of L with
S. Then, O sends the encrypted tx to E (i.e., function SiдnTx())
together with the header and the proofs that bind tx to L, i.e., to its
version #(LRootpb ). In the function SiдnTx() (see Algorithm 1), E
decrypts tx and checks whether it is correctly parsed and whether
its signature is correct. If these checks are not successful, E includes
this information into a status of the response and signs it. If the
checks are successful, E proceeds to the verification of provided
proofs with regard to the version #(LRootpb ) of L synchronized to S.
Upon successful verification, E signs both the transaction’s status
and the hash of encrypted tx , and then returns them to O, who
publishes the signature and the status through S (i.e., the function
ResolveCensTx()). When S receives the message with the status
of tx signed by E, it computes the hash of etx and uses it in the
5Note that to save operational costs for allocating storage of the the smart contract
platform, S can store only the hash of etx instead (see Section 5.2.1).
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Figure 7: Protocol for resolution of a censored query (ΠCQ ).
signature verification. In the successful case, S updates the status of
the suspected censored transaction with the result from E. Finally,
S notifies C and O about the resolution of tx .
4.5 Resolution of Censored Queries
Besides censoring transactions, O might also censor read queries
of Cs. When C suspects O of censoring a read query qry (see Fig-
ure 7), C initiates inclusion of qry through S. In detail, C creates
a transaction of the public blockchain platform, which calls the
function SubmitCensQry() (see Algorithm 2) with qry encrypted
by PKpb
E
(i.e., equery) as an argument and sends it to S. S does
the access control (see Section 6.1.2), appends equery to the list of
censored requests, and generates asynchronous event informing
O about new unresolved query. When O receives the event, first
she decrypts qry through E, then fetches the data requested by
qry and computes their inclusion proof(s) π<∗>data in the version of
L synchronized to S.6 Then, O sends the encrypted qry to E (i.e.,
function SiдnQry⟨∗⟩()) together with the fetched data and their
inclusion proof π<∗>data . In the function SiдnQry⟨∗⟩(), E decrypts
qry and checks whether it is correctly parsed. Upon the success,
E proceeds to the verification of π<∗>data with regards to the passed
data and the version #(LRootpb ) of L synchronized with S. Upon
successful verification, E encrypts data by PKpb
C
(i.e., edata) and
signs the triplet consisting of the transaction’s status, the hash
of eqry, and the hash of edata; which are returned to O. Then, O
6Note that if the query requests non-existing data,O creates an exclusion proof instead.
calls the function ResolveCensQry() of S (see Algorithm 2) with
signature, status, and encrypted data contained in the arguments.
When S receives the message with the status of qry signed by E,
it computes the hashes of equery and edata, and it uses them in
the signature verification. Upon successful verification, S updates
the status and edata of the suspected censored query with the data
from E. Finally, S notifies C and O about the resolution of qry. We
provide code of E specific to censorship resolution and examples
of handling different queries in Appendix A.1.
4.6 Terminated and Failed Enclave
During the execution of proдE, E stores its secrets and state objects
in a sealed file, which is updated and stored on the hard drive
of O with each new block created. Hence, if E terminates due a
temporary reason, such as a power outage or intentional command
byO, it can be initialized again byOwho provides Ewith the sealed
file; this file is used to recover its protected state objects.
However, if E experiences a permanent hardware failure of TEE,
the sealed file cannot be decrypted on other TEE platforms. There-
fore, we propose a simple mechanism that deals with this situation
under the assumption that O is the only allowed entity that can
replace the platform of E. In detail, O first snapshots the header
hdrsync of the last block that was synchronized with S as well
as all blocks blksunsync of L that were not synchronized with S.
Then, O restores L and her internal state objects into the version
#(LRootpb ). After the restoration of L, O calls the function ReInit()
of E (see Algorithm 3) with hdrsync , blksunsync , and LRootpb as
the arguments. In this function, E first generates its public/private
key-pair SKpb
E
, PK
pb
E
, and then stores the passed header as hdrlast
and copies the passed root hash into LRootcur and LRootpb . Then,
E iterates over all passed unprocessed blocks and their transactions
txs , which are executed within VM of E. Before the processing of
txs of each passed block, E calls the unprotected code ofO to obtain
the current partial state ∂stold of L and incremental proof template
(see Section 4.2.2) that serves for extending L within E. However,
these unprotected calls are always verified within E and malicious
O cannot misuse them. In detail, E verifies ∂stold obtained from O
against the root hash of the state stored in the last header hdrlast
of E, while the incremental proof template is also verified against
LRootcur in the function newLRoot() of E.
Next, E processes txs of a block, extends L, and then it calls
the unprotected code of O again, but this time to process txs of
Algorithm 3: Reinitialization of a failed E (part of proдE).
function ReInit (LRootold , prevBlks[], hdrlast ) public
(SKpbE , PK
pb
E )← Σpb .Keyдen();
hdrlast ← hdrlast ;
LRootcur ← LRootold , LRootpb ← LRootold ;
for {b : prevBlks } do
π incnext , LRoottmp ← proдO .next IncProof ();
∂stold ← proдO .дetPar tialState(b .txs);
assert ∂stold .root = hdrlast .stRoot ;
. . . ← processT xs(b .txs, ∂stold , π incnext , LRoottmp );
LRootr et ← proдO .runVM (b .txs); ▷ Run VM at O.
assert LRootcur = LRootr et ; ▷ E and O are at the same point.
σ ← Σpb .siдn(SKpbE , (LRootpb , LRootcur ));
Output(LRootpb , LRootcur , σ , PKEpb , PK
E
tee );
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Figure 8: Performance of Aquareum for native payments.
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Figure 9: Performance of Aquareum for ERC20 smart contract calls.
the current block by O, and thus getting the same version and
state of L in both E and O. Note that any adversarial effect of this
unprotected call is eliminated by the checks made after the former
two unprotected calls. When all passed blocks are processed, E
signs the version transition pair ⟨LRootpb ,LRootcur ⟩ and returns it
toO, together with the new public keys of E.O creates a blockchain
transaction that calls the function ReplaceEnc() of Swith data from
E passed in the arguments. In ReplaceEnc(), S first verifies whether
the signature of the transaction was made by O to avoid MiTM
attacks on this functionality. Then, S calls its function PostLRoot()
with the signed version transition pair in the arguments. Upon the
success, the current root hash of L is updated and S replaces the
stored E’s PKs by PKs passed in parameters. Finally, E informs Cs
by an event containing new PKs of E, and Cs perform the remote
attestation of proдE using the new key PKEtee and the attestation
service. We refer the reader to Algorithm 4 in Appendix for the
relevant pseudo-code of O.
5 IMPLEMENTATION
We have made a proof-of-concept implementation of Aquareum,
where we utilized Intel SGX and C++ for instantiation of E, while S
was built on top of Ethereum and Solidity. Although Aquareum can
be integrated with various VMs running within E, we selected EVM
since it provides a Turing-complete execution environment and it
is widely adopted in the community of decentralized applications.
In detail, we utilized OpenEnclave SDK [38] and a minimalistic
EVM, called eEVM [35]. However, eEVM is designed with the stan-
dard C++ map for storing the full state of L, which lacks efficient
integrity-oriented operations. Moreover, eEVM assumes the unlim-
ited size of E for storing the full state, while the size of E in SGX is
constrained to ∼100 MB. This might work with enabled swapping
but the performance of E would be significantly deteriorated with
a large full state. Due to these limitations, we replaced eEVM’s full
state handling by Merkle-Patricia Trie from Aleth [16], which we
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Figure 10: Costs for resolution of censored transactions and queries.
customized to support operations with the partial state. O and C
were also implemented in C++.
Our implementation enables the creation and interaction of sim-
ple accounts as well as the deployment and execution of smart con-
tracts written in Solidity.We verified the code of S by static/dynamic
analysis tools Mythril [10], Slither [44], and ContractGuard [20];
none of them detected any vulnerabilities. The source code of our
implementation will be made available upon publication of our
work.
5.1 Performance Evaluation
All our experiments were performed on commodity laptop with
Intel i7-10510U CPU supporting SGX v1, and they were aimed at
reproducing realistic conditions – i.e., they included all operations
and verifications described in Section 4, such as verification of re-
coverable ECDSA signatures, aggregation of transactions byMerkle
tree, integrity verification of partial state, etc. We evaluated the
performance of Aquareum in terms of transaction throughput per
second, where we distinguished transactions with native payments
(see Figure 8) and transactions with ERC20 smart contract calls
(see Figure 9). All measurements were repeated 100 times, and we
depict the mean and standard deviation in the graphs.
5.1.1 A Size of the Full State. The performance of Aquareum
is dependent on a size of data that is copied fromO to E upon call of
Exec(). The most significant portion of the copied data is a partial
state, which depends on the height of the MPT storing the full
state. Therefore, we repeated our measurements with two different
full states, one containing 1k accounts and another one containing
10k accounts. In the case of native payments, the full state with
10k accounts caused a decrease of throughput by 7.8%-12.1% (with
enabled TB) in contrast to the full state with 1k accounts. In the
case of smart contract calls, the performance deterioration was in
the range 2.8%-8.4% (with enabled TB).
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5.1.2 Block Size & Turbo Boost. In each experiment, we var-
ied the block size in terms of the number of transactions aggregated
in the block. Initially, we performed measurements with enabled
Turbo Boost (see Figure 8a and Figure 9a), where we witnessed a
high throughput and its high variability. For smart contract calls
(see Figure 9a), the throughput increased with the size of the block
modified from 1 to 1000 by 45.7% and 38.7% for a full state with
1k and 10k accounts, respectively. However, in the case of native
payments the improvement was only 4.3% and 2.8%, while the
throughput was not increased monotonically with the block size.
Therefore, we experimentally disabled Turbo Boost (see Fig-
ure 8b) and observed the monotonic increase of throughput with
increased block size, where the improvement achieved was 11.41%
and 12.26% for a full state with 1k and 10k accounts, respectively.
For completeness, we also disabled Trubo Boost in the case of smart
contract calls (see Figure 9b), where the performance improvement
was 20.9% and 26.7% for both full states under consideration.
5.2 Analysis of Costs
Besides the operational cost resulting from running the centralized
infrastructure, Aquareum imposes costs for interaction with the
public blockchain with S deployed. The deployment cost of S is
1.51M of gas and the cost of most frequent operation – syncing L
with S (i.e., PostLRoot()) – is 33k of gas, which is only 33% higher
than the cost of a standard Ethereum transaction.7 For example, if
L is synced with S every 5 minutes, O’s monthly expenses for this
operation would be 285M of gas, while in the case of syncing every
minute, monthly expenses would be 1, 425M of gas.8
5.2.1 CensorshipResolution. Ourmechanism for censorship
resolution imposes costs on Cs submitting requests as well as for O
resolving these requests. The cost of submitting a censored request
is mainly dependent on the size of the request/response andwhether
S keeps data of a request/response in the storage (i.e., an expensive
option) or whether it just emits an asynchronous event with the
data (i.e., a cheap option). We measured the costs of both options
and the results are depicted in Figure 10. Nevertheless, for practical
usage, only the option with event emitting is feasible (see solid lines
in Figure 10).
Figure 10a and Figure 10b depict the resolution of a censored
transaction, which is more expensive forC than forO, who resolves
each censored transaction with constant cost 49k of gas (see Fig-
ure 10b). On the other hand, the resolution of censored queries is
more expensive for O since she has to deliver a response with data
to S (see Figure 10d), while C submits only a short query, e.g., get a
transaction (see Figure 10c).
6 SECURITY ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we demonstrate resilience of Aquareum against
adversarial actions that the malicious operator A can perform to
violate the desired properties (see Section 3.2).
Theorem 6.1. (Correctness)A is unable to modify the full state of
L in a way that does not respect the semantics of VM deployed in E.
7This cost is low since we leverage the native signature scheme of the blockchain Σpb .
8Representing $305 and $1525 as of May 2020, assuming standard gas price of 5 GWEI.
Justification. The update of the L’s state is performed exclu-
sively in E. Since E contains trusted code that is publicly known
and remotely attested by Cs, A cannot tamper with this code. □
Theorem 6.2. (Consistency) A is unable to extend L while modi-
fying the past records of L.
Justification. All extensions of L are performed within trusted
code of E, while utilizing the history tree [12] as a tamper evident
data structure, which enables us to make only such incremental
extensions of L that are consistent with L’s past. □
Theorem 6.3. (Verifiability) A is unable to unnoticeably modify
or delete a transaction tx that was previously inserted to L using ΠN ,
if sync with S was executed anytime afterward.
Justification. Since tx was correctly executed (Theorem 6.1)
as a part of the block bi in a trusted code of E, E produced a signed
version transition pair {h(Li−1),h(Li )}E of L from the version i − 1
to the new version i that corresponds to Lwith bi included.A could
either sync Lwith S immediately afterbi was appended or she could
do itn versions later. In the first case,A published {h(Li−1),h(Li )}E
to S, which updated its current version of L to i by storingh(Li ) into
LRootpb . In the second case, n blocks were appended to L, obtaining
its (i + n)th version. E executed all transactions from versions (i +
1), . . . , (i + n) of L, while preserving correctness (Theorem 6.1) and
consistency (Theorem 6.2). Then E generated a version transition
pair {h(Li−1),h(Li+n )}E and A posted it to S, where the current
version of L was updated to i + n by storing h(Li+n ) into LRootpb .
When any C requests tx and its proofs from A with regard to
publicly visible LRootpb , she might obtain a modified tx ′ with a
valid membership proof πmemhdri of the block bi but an invalid Merkle
proof πmktx ′ , which cannot be forged. □
In the case of tx deletion, A provides C with the tampered full
block b ′i (maliciously excluding tx ) whose membership proof π
mem
hdr ′i
is invalid – it cannot be forged. □
Theorem 6.4. (Non-Equivocation) Assuming L synced with S: A
is unable to provide two distinct Cs with two distinct valid views on L.
Justification. Since L is regularly synced with publicly visible
S, and S stores only a single current version of L (i.e., LRootpb ), all
Cs share the same view on L. □
Theorem 6.5. (Censorship Evidence) A is unable to censor any
request (transaction or query) from C while staying unnoticeable.
Justification. If C’s request is censored, C asks for a resolu-
tion of the request through public S.A observing the request might
either ignore it and leave the proof of censoring at S or she might
submit the request to E and obtain an enclave signed proof wit-
nessing that a request was processed – this proof is submitted to S,
whereby publicly resolving the request. □
6.1 Other Properties and Implications
6.1.1 Privacy VS Performance. Aquareum provides privacy
of data submitted to S during the censorship resolution since the
requests and responses are encrypted. However, Aquareum does not
provide privacy against O who has the read access to L. Although
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Aquareum could be designed with the support of full privacy, a
disadvantage of such an approach would be the performance drop
caused by the decryption of requested data from L upon every C’s
read query, requiring a call of E. In contrast, with partial-privacy,
O is able to respond queries of Cs without touching E.
6.1.2 Access Control at S. Cs interact with S only through
functions for submission of censored requests. Nevertheless, access
to these functions must be regulated through an access control
mechanism in order to avoid exhaustion (i.e., DoS) of this func-
tionality by external entities. This can be performed with a simple
access control requiring Cs to provide access tickets when calling
the functions of S. An access ticket could be provisioned by C upon
registration at O, and it could contain PKpb
C
with a time expiration
of the subscription, signed by E. Whenever C initiates a censored
request, verification of an access ticket would be made by S, due to
which DoS of this functionality would not be possible.
6.1.3 Security of TEE. Aquareum assumes that its TEE plat-
form is secure. However, recent research showed that this might
not be the case in practical implementations of TEE, such as SGX
that was vulnerable to memory corruption attacks [4] as well as
side channel attacks [5, 48]. A number of software-based defense
and mitigation techniques have been proposed [5, 7, 19, 42, 43] and
some vulnerabilities were patched by Intel at the hardware level [25].
Nevertheless, we note that Aquareum is TEE-agnostic thus can be
integrated with other TEEs such as ARM TrustZone or RISC-V
architectures (using Keystone-enclave [15] or Sanctum [11]).
6.1.4 Time to Finality. Many blockchain platforms suffer from
accidental forks, which temporarily create parallel inconsistent
blockchain views. To mitigate this phenomenon, it is recommended
to wait a certain number of block confirmations after a given block
is created, considering it irreversible. This waiting time (a.k.a., time
to finality) influences the non-equivocation property of Aquareum,
and Aquareum inherits it from the underlying blockchain plat-
form. Most blockchains have a long time to finality, e.g., ∼3mins
in Bitcoin [37], ∼3mins in Ethereum [49], ∼2mins in Cardano [26].
However, some blockchains have a short time to finality, e.g., Hon-
eyBadgerBFT [36], Algorand [18], and StrongChain [45]. The se-
lection of the underlying blockchain platform (or the protocol of
the consensus layer [24]) is dependent on the requirements of the
particular use case that Aquareum is applied for.
7 RELATEDWORK
Due to their importance and potential applications, centralized
ledgers, under different names (like logs, notaries, timestamp ser-
vices, etc.), were extensively investigated in the literature.
Append-Only Designs. The first line of research is around au-
thenticated append-only data structures. Haber and Stornetta [22]
proposed a hash chain associated with transactions, proving their
order. Subsequently, their work was improved [3] by aggregat-
ing transactions in a Merkle tree, allowing more efficient proofs
and updates. However, these constructions still require O(n) mes-
sages to prove that one version of the ledger is an extension of
another. Crosby and Wallach [12] introduced append-only logs
withO(logn)-long incremental and membership proofs. Certificate
Transparency (CT) [29] deploys this data structure to create a public
append-only log of digital certificates supporting efficient mem-
bership and extension proofs, but with inefficient exclusion proofs.
The idea of CT’s publicly verifiable logs was then extended to
other applications, like revocation transparency [28], binary trans-
parency [17], or key transparency [33]. The CT’s base construction
was further improved by systems combining an append-onlyMerkle
tree with an ordered Merkle tree [27, 41] aiming to implement a
variant of an authenticated append-only dictionary. Besides making
all certificates visible and append-only, these constructions use a
constructed key:value mapping to prove e.g., that a certificate is re-
voked, or that a given domain has a certain list of certificates. These
systems provide more powerful properties than CT, but unfortu-
nately, they have inefficientO(n) proofs in verifying both properties
of their logs at the same time (i.e., append-only ledger with the
correct key:value mapping). A construction of append-only dictio-
naries with succinct proofs was recently proposed [46]. Despite
achieving the desired properties, this construction relies on stronger
cryptographic assumptions. Moreover, the scheme has efficiency
bottlenecks as proving time grows with the data and as of today,
it is impractical even for low transaction throughputs. The system
also requires a trusted setup which may be unacceptable for many
applications (like public ledgers). Finally, schemes of this class are
designed for use cases specific to key:value databases, unable to
handle smart contracts as of today.
Non-Equivocation Designs. Although the above systems try
to minimize trust in the operator of a ledger and aim at public veri-
fiability by deploying cryptographic constructions, they require an
out of band mechanism to provide non-equivocation. One family
of solutions detecting equivocations are gossip protocols, where
users exchange their ledger views in order to find any inconsis-
tencies [9, 13]. A disadvantage of these solutions is that they are
primarily detective, unable to effectively prevent equivocation at-
tacks. Moreover, these solutions are usually underspecified, and we
are not aware of any system of this class deployed for this use case.
Another approach for providing the non-equivocation of a ledger
was proposed by introducing multiple auditing nodes [2, 27] run-
ning a consensus protocol. Mitigations of this class, like the one
proposed in Aquareum, include systems built on top of a blockchain
platform (providing non-equivocation by design). An advantage
of those solutions is that they are as strong as the underlying
blockchain platform and with some latency (i.e., minutes) can pre-
vent operator equivocations. Catena [47] proposes a system where
a centralized log proves its non-equivocation by posting a sequence
of integrity preserving transactions in the Bitcoin blockchain for
its updates. However, it requires clients to obtain all Catena trans-
actions and their number is linear with the number of log updates.
PDFS [21] reduces this overhead (to constant) by a smart contract
that validates consistency with the past by incremental update of
the ledger using the history tree data structure (similarly, as in
Aquareum); however, it does not guarantee the correct execution.
Decentralized Designs with TEE. Several systems combine
TEE with blockchains, mostly with the intention to improve the
lacking properties of blockchains like confidentiality or through-
put bottlenecks. The most related work includes Teechain [30],
a system where Bitcoin transactions can be executed off-chain
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in TEE enclaves. By relying on properties provided by TEE, the
scheme can support secure, efficient, and scalable Bitcoin trans-
fers. Another system is Ekiden [8], which offloads smart contract
execution to dedicated TEE-supported parties. These parties can ex-
ecute smart contract transactions efficiently and privately and since
they are agnostic to the blockchain consensus protocol the trans-
action throughput can be scaled horizontally. A similar approach
is taken by Das et al. [14] who propose FastKitten. In contrast to
the previous work, the authors focus on backward compatibility,
choosing Bitcoin as the blockchain platform and enhancing it with
Turing-complete smart contracts (Bitcoin natively supports only
simple smart contracts). In FastKitten, smart contracts are executed
off-chain within TEE of the operator. The focus of FastKitten is the
execution of multi-round smart contracts within the set of parties
who interact with the operator. FastKitten supports native coins of
the underlying blockchain due to SPV verification of coin locking
transactions embedded into TEE. Custos [39] focuses on a detection
of tampering with system logs and it utilizes TEE for the logger and
decentralized auditors. However, auditors must regularly perform
audit challenges to detect tampering, which is expensive and time
consuming. In contrast, Aquareum provides instant efficient proofs
of data genuineness or tampering upon request of the data.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed Aquareum, a framework for central-
ized ledgers, which provides verifiability, non-equivocation, and
censorship evidence. To achieve these properties, we leveraged a
combination of TEE and public blockchain with support for Turing-
complete smart contracts. We showed that Aquareum is deployable
with the current tools and is able to process over 450 transactions
per second on a commodity PC, while accounting for the overhead
of all verifications and updates.
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A APPENDIX
A.1 Examples of Censored Queries
While in Section 4.5 and Figure 7 we omit the details about the data
that a query might fetch, here we describe two examples.
Get Transaction. In the first example, a query fetches the trans-
action tx identified by idtx that is part of the block identified
by idblk .9 Upon notification from S about unresolved request, O
fetches the full block with ID equal to idblk ,10 computes its mem-
bership proof πmemhdr in the version #(LRootpb ) of L, and calls the
function SiдnQryTx() of E (see Algorithm 6) with these data in
the arguments. E verifies πmemhdr and search for tx with idtx in the
passed block. If tx is found, E signs encrypted tx and the positive
status of the query. On the other hand, if tx is not found in the block,
E signs the negative query status and empty data. The signature,
the status, and encrypted tx are passed to S, where the censorship
of query is finished.
Get Account State. In the second example, a query fetches an
account state as identified by idas from the most recent version
#(LRootcur ) of L. When O is notified by S about an unresolved re-
quest, O retrieves as from MPT trie storing the full global state of L,
computes itsMPT proof πmptas ,11 and calls the function SiдnQryAS()
of E (see Algorithm 6) with these data in the arguments. E verifies
π
mpt
as with regards to #(LRootcur ), and if it is a positive MPT proof,
E signs the encrypted as and a positive status of the query. In con-
trary, if πmptas is a negative MPT proof, E signs the negative query
9To verify whether the block with idblk exists, we check idblk ≤ #(LRootpb ).
10Note that a full block is required to pass into E since Merkle tree (aggregating
transactions) does not support exclusion proofs, and thus all transactions of the block
need to be compared.
11If as is not found, πmptas serves as a negative proof of as .
Algorithm 4: The program proдO of service operator O
▷ Variables and functions of O:
PK teeE , PK
pb
E : public keys of enclave E (under Σtee & Σpb ),
PKO, SKO : keypair of operator O (under Σpb ),
proдE, proдS : program of enclave/smart contract,
txsu : cache of unprocessed TXs,
blks#p : counter of processed blocks, not synced with PB yet,
τvm, τpb : time of the last flush to enclave/PB,
statecur ←⊥: current full global state of VM,
censT xs ← []: cache of posted censored TXs to S,
L ← []: data of L (not synced with PB),
LRootpb : the last root of L flushed to PB,
LRootcur : the current root of L (not flushed to PB),
σlast : a signature of the last version transition pair signed by E,
▷ Declaration of types and constants:
Block {hdr, txs, rcps };
FL#vm, FL
#
pb : # of txs/blocks for flushing to enclave/PB,
FLτvm, FL
τ
pb : timeout for flushing to enclave/PB,
▷ Declaration of functions:
function Init ()
PK teeE , PK
pb
E ← proдE .Init ();
proдS .Init (PKpbE , PK teeE , PKO);
functionUponRecvTx (tx )
assert accessControl(tx );
txsu .add(tx );
if |txsu | = FL#vm ∨ now () − FLτvm ≥ τvm then
π incnext , LRoottmp ← next IncProof ();
LRootpb , LRootcur , ∂stnew , hdr, rcps, txser , σlast ←
proдE .Exec(txsu , ∂statecur , π incnext , LRoottmp );
statecur .update(∂stnew );
L.add(Block(hdr , txsu \ txser , rcps ));
txsu ← []; blks#p ← blks#p + 1 ;
▷ Sync with S on public blockchain
if blks#p = FL#pb ∨ now () − FLτpb ≥ τpb then
proдS .PostLRoot (LRootpb , LRootcur , σlast );
proдE .F lush();
r esolveCensT xs();
blks#p ← 0 ;
function next IncProof ()
LRoottmp ← L.add (Block(⊥, [], []));
π incnext ← L.IncProof (LRootcur , LRoottmp ) ;
L.deleteLastBlock ();
return π incnext , LRoottmp ; ▷ It serves as an incr. proof template for E.
function RestoreFailedEnc()
hdrsync ← L[#(LRootpb ) − 1].hdr ;
blksunsync ← L[#(LRootpb ) : -1] ;
L.r estore(#(LRootpb )); ▷ Restore all data to the target version.
LRootA, LRootB, σ , PKEpb , PK
E
tee ←
proдE .ReInit (LRootpb , blksunsync , hdrsync );
assert LRootcur = LRootA ; ▷ E and O run VM into the same point.
proдS .ReplaceEnc(PKEpb , PKEtee , LRootA, LRootB, σ );
status and the empty data. The signature, status, and encrypted as
are passed to S, where the censorship of the query is completed.
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Algorithm 5: Censorship resolution in O (part of proдO)
functionUponPostedCensTX (etx, idxr eq )
tx ← proдE .Decrypt (etx );
censT xs .add ({tx, etx, idxr eq });
UponRecvTx (tx ); ▷ Delay response until the current block is finished.
functionUponPostedCensQry(equery, idxr eq )
qry ← parse(proдE .Decrypt (equery));
if READ_TX = qry .type then
blk ← дetBlockById (qry .idblk );
πmemhdr ← L.MemProof (blk .hdr .ID, LRootpb );
σ , status, edata ← proдE .SiдnQryTx (equery, blk, πmemhdr );
else if READ_AS = qry .type then
as ← statecur .дet (qry .idas );
πmptas ← L.MptProof (qry .idas ); ▷ Inclusion/exclusion proof.
σ , status, edata ← proдE .SiдnQryAS (equery, as, πmptas );
proдS .ResolveCensQry(idxr eq, status, edata, σ );
function r esolveCensT xs ()
for {ct : censT xs } do
blk ← дetBlockOf T x (h(ct .tx ), L);
πmemhdr ← L.MemProof (blk .hdr .ID, LRootpb );
πmktx ← MkProof (ct .tx, blk .txs);
σ , status ← proдE .SiдnTx (ct .etx, πmktx , blk .hdr, πmemhdr );
proдS .ResolveCensT x (ct .idxr eq, status, σ );
censT xs ← [];
Algorithm 6: Censorship resolution in E (part of proдE).
function Decrypt (edata) public
data ← Σpb .Decrypt (SKpbE , edata);
Output(data);
function SiдnTx (etx, πmktx , hdr, πmemhdr ) public
▷ Resolution of a censored write tx.
tx ← Σpb .Decrypt (SKpbE , etx );
if ERROR = parse(tx ) then
status = PARSING_ERROR;
else if ERROR = Σpb .V er if y((tx .σ , tx .PKpbC ), tx ) then
status = SIGNATURE_ERROR;
else
▷ Verify proofs binding TX to header and header to L.
assert πmktx .Verify(tx, hdr .txsRoot );
assert πmemhdr .Verify(hdr .ID, hdr, LRootpb );
status ← INCLUDED;
▷ TX was processed, so E can issue a proof.
σ ← Σpb .siдn(SKpbE , (h(etx ), status));
Output(σ , status );
function SiдnQryTx (equery, blk, πmemhdr ) public
▷ Resolution of a censored read tx query.
. . . , idtx , idblk , PK
pb
C
← parse(Decrypt (equery));
if idblk > #(LRootpb ) then
status ← BLK_NOT_FOUND, edata ←⊥;
else
assert πmemhdr .Verify(blk .hdr .ID, blk .hdr, LRootpb );
assert VerifyBlock(blk); ▷ Full check of block consistency.
tx ← findTx(idtx , blk .txs);
if ⊥ = tx then
status ← TX_NOT_FOUND, edata ←⊥;
else
status ← OK, edata ← Σpb .Encrypt (PKpbC , tx );
σ ← Σpb .siдn(SKpbE , (h(equery), status, edata));
Output(σ , status , edata);
function SiдnQryAS (equery, as, πmptas ) public
▷ Resolution of a censored read account state query.
. . . , idas , PK
pb
C
← parse(Decrypt (equery));
if ⊥ = as then
assert πmptas .V er if yNeд(idas , LRootcur );
status ← NOT_FOUND, edata ←⊥;
else
assert πmptas .V er if y(idas , LRootcur );
status ← OK, edata ← Σpb .Encrypt (PKpbC , as);
σ ← Σpb .siдn(SKpbE , (h(equery), status, h(edata)));
Output(σ , status , edata);
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